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Circuit Council Reform: A Boat Hook for Judges 
and Court Administrators 
Michael J. Remington* 
In quiet and untroubled times it seems to every adminis- 
trator that it is only by his efforts that the whole population 
under his rule is kept going, and in this consciousness of being 
indispensable every administrator finds the chief reward of his 
labor and efforts. While the sea of history remains calm the 
ruler-administrator in his frail bark, holding on a boat hook to 
the ship of the people and himself moving, naturally imagines 
that his efforts move the ship he is holding on to. But as soon 
as a storm arises and the sea begins to heave and the ship to 
move, such a delusion is no longer possible. The ship moves 
independently with its own enormous motion, the boat hook no 
longer reaches the moving vessel, and suddenly the administra- 
tor, instead of appearing a ruler and a source of power, be- 
comes an insignificant, useless, feeble man.' 
Troubled waters surround the federal judicial vessel. For 
years, even in calmer seas, water has come dangerously close to 
washing over the gunwale of the craft. Too many passengers 
huddled aboard have caused the vessel to sink lower and 10wer.~ 
* Counsel, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives. 
B.S., 1967, J.D., 1973, University of Wisconsin. 
The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily represent the views 
of the House Committee on the Judiciary or of any Members of the United States 
Congress. 
I would like to express special appreciation to Frank J. Remington, Thomas D. 
Rowe, Jr., and Russell Wheeler for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Arti- 
cle. In addition, I would like to thank Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, 
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of 
Justice, for making this Article possible. 
1. L. TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE bk. 11, 507 (L. & A. Maude trans. 1952). 
2. Much has been written about the overload crisis in the federal courts. See, e.g., 
State of the Judiciary and Access to Justice: Hearings on State of the Judiciary and 
Access to Justice Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administra- 
tion of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [here- 
inafter cited as Hearings on the State of the Judiciary]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
COMMI'LTEE ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 1-4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS]; THE POUND 
CONFERENCE: P RSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Levin & R. Wheeler eds. 1979) 
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Fortunately, the boat is watertight and its excellent buoyancy 
has kept it afloat. 
The purpose of this Article is not to discuss the overall sea- 
worthiness of the federal judiciary or the number of passengers 
it carries. The Article will, however, discuss several basic 
problems of judicial administration and place them in their his- 
torical context. It will then examine the administrative structure 
that has kept the craft on an even keel in the past. Finally, it 
will discuss a recently enacted statute, The Judicial Councile 
Reform & Judicial Conduct & Discipline Act of 1980 (Judicial 
Councils Reform A~t)~-a boat hook of sorts-that will provide 
federal judges and judicial administrators with a modest tool to 
keep abreast of their obligations.' This tool will not save the ju- 
dicial branch, but if used properly it will be a useful implement. 
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION 
A. Tension Created By The Separation of Powers 
Ours is a constitut.ional government based on a separation 
of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches.' Article I11 of the Constitution-the judiciary's bea- 
[hereinafter cited as POUND CONFERENCE]; H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GEN- 
ERAL VIEW 3-4 (1972). 
The Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Peter W. Rodino, Jr., has 
observed: "One of the most difficult and persistent problems facing the House Judiciary 
Committee is what to do about the ubiquitous overload in the federal courts--an over- 
load so insidious that it threatens the very health of the entire federal judicial system." 
Rodino, Magistrates' Reform-A Way to Aid Congested Federal Courts, 13 TRUL 32 
(Nov. 1977). 
I t  should be recognized, however, that some now question the existence of a conges- 
tion crisis. See Cavanagh & Sarat, Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a Juris- 
prudence of Judicial Competence, 14 L. & Soc. REV. 371 (1980). 
3. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035. 
4. The principal purpose of the Judicial Councils Reform Act is to create a mecha- 
nism and procedure through which the judicial branch can consider and respond to com- 
plaints against federal judicial officers. Id. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1313, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1 (1980); S. REP. NO. 96-362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979), reprinted in [1980] 
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7767, 7767. Equally important, the Act is designed to 
improve the overall functioning of the decentralized circuit councils, recipients of the 
bulk of the legislatively delegated judicial discipline and disability responsibility. H.R. 
REP. NO. 96-1313,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980); S. REP. NO. 96-304,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1, 3-5 (1979). By delaying the effective date of the legislation until October 1, 1981, the 
Congress gave the judicial branch adequate time to prepare for the Act's impact. Pub. L. 
NO. 96-458, 5 7, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980). 
5. That "the doctrine of separation of powers . . . is at  the heart of our Constitu- 
tion" scarcely needs reiteration. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,119 (1976). See Kilbourn v. 
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con-vests the independent judicial power of the United States 
"in one Supreme Court" and in "inferior" federal courts.= How- 
ever, it authorizes Congress to organize the Supreme Court7 and 
to establish inferior courts as it deems necessar~.~ Since Con- 
gress is the creator of the structure and jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courts, there is little question that the legislative branch 
possesses the resultant mandate of overseeingB the functioning 
of almost all the federal judicial system, including its manage- 
ment and administration.lo Congress also has the budgetary au- 
thority to do this. These responsibilities are important and 
should be taken seriously. 
As befits a system of separation of powers with checks and 
balances, there is a counterweight to Congress' authority to over- 
see and legislate for the federal judiciary. The framers promoted 
the independence of the judiciary by providing lifetime tenure 
for judges, erecting a bar against diminution of judges' salary 
while in office,ll and equipping the federal judiciary with the 
power to review Congressional enactments.12 Indisputably, in 
American history "[aln independent judiciary has been a great 
rock in stormy seas."ls 
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1881); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (J. Madison). 
6. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 8 1. See J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW 
MAKERS 108-09 (1950). Professor Hurst relates that the decision to create and organize 
the inferior Federal courts had two implications. First, as compared to many state con- 
stitutions, it left room for future possibilities of flexible experimentation and adjustment. 
Second, it meant that in any test of strength between Congress and the inferior courts, 
Congress could prevail. Id. at  109. 
7. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 8 2. The Constitution grants the Supreme Court appellate 
jurisdiction "with such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 
make" over all cases within the judicial power of the United States. Id. at  cl. 2. For 
further discussion, see Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court, 109 U .  PA. L. REV. 157 (1960). 
8. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 8 1. The First Congress-in the Judiciary Act of 1789--exer- 
cised its option to create lower federal courts. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
9. The "oversight function" of Congress is relatively new. I t  was first authorized by 
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, now codified at  2 U.S.C. 8 190d(a) (1976). 
10. See, e.g., Hearings on the State of the Judiciary, supra note 2, at  7 (letter from 
Warren E. Burger); REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-61 (1981). 
11. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980). 
12. Although not expressly conveyed in the Constitution, the power of the federal 
courts to test legislative enactments was soon found to be implicit. Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
13. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975, a t  195 (1980). The House Judiciary 
Committee has shown great respect for this proposition: "The Committee recognizes that 
it would venture onto very thin constitutional turf if it elected to erode the cherished 
value of judicial independence: which may be of more importance today than it was 
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A tension exists between the constitutional mandate to pre- 
serve and protect the independence of the judiciary and the con- 
gressional responsibility to equip the courts with a modern, flex- 
ible, rational and responsible administrative structure. Yet, both 
independence and efficiency are necessary components of our ju- 
dicial system. An independent judiciary is an empty shell if citi- 
zens lack confidence in it." Constitutional rights are meaning- 
less if there are no adequate procedures to vindicate them and if 
governmental institutions fail to act with integrity, honesty, con- 
sistency, and efficiency.16 
Throughout its history the judicial branch, with a modicum 
of congressional support, has shown a resilient ability to evolve 
new mechanisms and procedures to meet the constantly chang- 
ing demands placed on it.16 In short, it is possible that out of 
this tension between the independence of the federal judiciary 
and congressional involvement in the administration of the fed- 
eral courts can come understanding and satisfaction of both ju- 
dicial independence and effective administration. A thoughtful 
federal judge, writing in this law review, aptly observed, "Out of 
conflict may come acceptable and even beneficial compromise. 
The inevitable conflict, the inherent tension, need not be disrup- 
tive of the work of doing justice."17 
Due to its national perspective and political responsibility, 
Congress paints in broad brush strokes when it specifies the pa- 
rameters of federal jurisdiction and structure.18 However, be- 
when the Constitution was written." H.R. REP. No. 96-1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 
(1980). 
14. There are grounds to believe that this is occurring. In a recent public opinion 
poll, only 29% indicated a high degree of confidence in the federal courts, the more 
knowledgeable and experienced the individual, the more likely that he would have unfa- 
vorable feelings about the courts. Yankelovich, Skelly, & White, Inc., The Public Image 
of the Courts: Highlights of a National Survey of the General Public, Judges, Lawyers, 
and Community Leaders, in STATE COURTS: BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE 5 (T. Fetter ed. 
1978). 
15. See, e.g., Judicial Tenure and Discipline-1979-80: Hearings on Judicial Ten- 
ure and Discipline 1979-80 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d 
Sess. 160 (1979-1980) (Statement of Maurice Roeenberg) [hereinafter cited as Hearings 
on Judicial Tenure]. 
16. Cavanagh & Sarat, supra note 2, at  373. 
17. See Wallace, Judicial Administration in a System of Independents: A Tribe 
with Only Chiefs, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 39,39. Judge Wallace was referring to a different, 
albeit similar, tension that exists within the judicial branch: that between judicial inde- 
pendence and effective internal administration. 
18. See generally Hearings on the State of the Judiciary, supra note 2, at 3-4 
(statement of Robert W. Kastenmeier); Kaatenmeier & Remington, Court Reform and 
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cause of the nature of day-to-day judicial administration and 
management, Congress properly plays a more limited role in this 
area. It is unlikely that the federal judiciary could tolerate the 
burden of continuous tinkering required to cure every little out- 
cropping of inefficiency. Congressional efforts to become inti- 
mately involved in the daily &airs of the judiciary by creating 
priorities for certain civil cases, special appeal routes, and 
mandatory appeals have for the most part proven to be fail- 
ures.Is Further, the solution to many problems of judicial admin- 
istration can and should be self-imposed by the judiciary itself, 
which generally is able to deal with them. 
If Congress provides the structure to meet the constantly 
changing responsibilities given the courts, and if the judiciary is 
willing to impose some time-proven management techniques on 
itself, then more efficient administration of justice can be 
achieved. Let us now turn to an examination of judicial adminis- 
tration problems presently confronting the federal judiciary. 
B. Basic Problems of Federal Judicial Administration 
The most visible symptoms of the problems confronting the 
federal judicial system are the overburdened courts and high 
costs of litigation caused by the legalization and judicialization 
of American society on a massive scale.M These problems, if not 
diagnosed and effectively treated within the near future, will 
have deleterious long-term effects. As the United States Depart- 
ment of Justice aptly observed, court congestion and rising costs 
are only two of the many signs of how skyrocketing caseloads are 
Access to Justice: A Legisbtive Perspective, 16 HARV. J. LEGIS. 301 (1979). 
19. At last count, there were at least sixty-two civil priorities, some applying to the 
trial level, some to the appellate level, and some to both. Those interested in improving 
judicial machinery have long been interested in abolishing all but the most necessary of 
these priorities. See, e.g., Report No. 109A to the House of Delegates of the American 
Bar Association by the Special Subcommittee on Coordination of Judicial Improvements 
211 (Midyear Meeting 1977). It is interesting to note that the ABA Resolution endorses 
the principle that the circuit council of each court of appeals set calendar priorities for 
the circuit. 
As to dissatisfaction with the creation of special appeal routes, see 124 CONG. REC. 
H10,747 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). 
As relates to the need to abolish the mandatory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 
see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE 
SUPREME COURT 25-38 (1972); NEEDS OF THE F F ~ R A L  COURTS, supra note 2, at 11-13. 
20. The United States has far more lawyers per capital than any other country in 
the world. According to the American Bar Association, the number of practicing attor- 
neys increased 83% between 1970 and 1980. 
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damaging our court system. 
There are others. Courts are forced to add more clerks, 
more administrative personnel, to move cases faster and faster. 
They are losing time for conference on cases, time for reflec- 
tion, time for the deliberate maturation of principles. We are, 
therefore, creating a workload that is even now changing the 
very nature of courts, threatening to convert them from delib- 
erative institutions to processing institutions, from a judiciary 
to a bureacracy. This development, dangerous to every citizen 
in our democracy, must be arrested and reversed. And it must 
be done in ways that will preserve the quality of justice in our 
federal courts.a1 
A respected federal judge seconded this diagnosis by warning 
that the federal courts have "too much work, too little time to 
do it, the necessity for delegation, inefficient management and, 
ultimately, the dilution of responsibility for decision-making? 
Caseload statistics show constant increases in the amount of 
adjudicative work courts are expected to do? Furthermore, 
cases filed in federal courts are becoming more complex and re- 
quire more active participation by the trial judge not only to re- 
solve the case on the merits but to formulate complex forms of 
21. NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 2, at 4. 
22. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice 
and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 648, 654 (1980). 
23. Although it can be argued persuasively that "statistics never prove anything," E. 
SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL 20 (1973), and that case filings are a poor approxima- 
tion of what really happens in court, Cavanagh & Sarat, supra note 2, at 386-87, they are 
the only measure that we have. Statistics show that in the eighteen-year period between 
1960 and 1978, the number of cases docketed in the federal district courts doubled, the 
number of appeals taken to the circuit courta of appeals increased fivefold, and the num- 
ber of cases filed in the Supreme Court doubled. [I9601 DIRECTOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 
U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 61-62; [I9791 DIRECTOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE U.S. COURTS ANN. 
REP. 2-7. During this same time period, United States magistrates (which did not even 
exist before 1968) disposed of several hundred thousand matters. See Diversity of Citi- 
zenship JurisdictionlMagistrates Reform: Hearings on Diversity of Citizenship Juris- 
dictionlMagistrates Reform Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the 
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
86, 182 (1977) (statements of Joseph D. Tydings and Daniel Meador). 
More work needs to be done in the area of statistical reporting. For example, there 
never has been an effort to factor in legislative improvements to judicial machinery. Al- 
though the district court filings have doubled, the amount of work per judge has not 
increased. In addition, weighted caseload reporting is still far behind the times. Clearly, 
more research needs to be done. See Hurst, The Functions of Courtb in the United 
States, 1950-1980 (Working Paper 1980-1, Disputes Processing Research Program, Univ. 
of Wisconsin, Madison); Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller, & McDougal, Measuring the Pace 
of Civil Litigation in Federal and State Trial Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 81, 113 (1981). 
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ongoing relief.24 Sometimes governmental activities are impli- 
cated, and often the relief granted affects persons not directly 
involved in the litigation. The remedy ordered may therefore re- 
quire the trial judge's continuing participation in administration 
and implementation." This is often the situation in cases involv- 
ing the rights of institutionalized persons, school desegregation, 
employment discrimination, environmental litigation, and 
an t i t r u~ t .~~  
The growth of the judicial workload, both in terms of num- 
bers and complexity, shows no signs of abating. For example, the 
96th Congress-not known as an activist Congress-created at 
least nine new federal causes of action.27 Even those recom- 
mending a slowdown in federal regulation and intrusion into the 
daily lives of citizens have put forward proposals that will in- 
crease the work of the federal courts.28 
24. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Pulic Law Litigation, 89 HAW. L. REV. 1281, 
1284 (1976). 
Judge Henry J. Friendly put it succinctly by stating during a congressional hearing, 
"Being a Federal judge today . . . is an altogether different and infinitely more demand- 
ing business than when I went on the bench eighteeen years ago." Diversity of Citizen- 
ship JurisdictionlMagistrates Reform: Hearings on Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdic- 
tionlMagistrates Reform Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
210 (1977). 
25. Chayes, note 24 supra. Professor Chayes concludes that the developing style of 
litigation has become a quasi-political process, with courts playing a role normally re- 
served for the legislature. 
26. As examples of these types of cases, see Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (rights of mentally retarded persons who are institutionalized); Pugh v. 
Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (rights of prison inmates who are 
institutionalized). 
For Congressional approval of this sort of public law dispute resolution, see Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980). 
27. Unsurprisingly, these bills were all in areas of rapid societal change: energy, en- 
vironmental protection, privacy, transportation, and civil rights. See, e.g., Act to Prevent 
Pollution from Ships, Pub. L. No. 96-478, § 11,94 Stat. 2297 (1980); Swine Health Pro- 
tection Act, Pub. L. No. 96-468, § 7,94 Stat. 2229 (1980); Household Goods Transporta- 
tion Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-454, g 7,94 Stat. 2011 (1980); Privacy Protection Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440,s 106,94 Stat. 1879; Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 
1980, 96 Pub. L. No. 96-320, 114,94 Stat. 974; Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96- 
294, $9 161-68, 94 Stat. 611, 672 (1980); Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 
Pub. L. No. 96-247, 5 3, 94 Stat. 349 (1980); Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-102,93 Stat. 749; Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 
Pub. L. NO. 96-95, fj 7, 93 Stat. 721. 
28. See S. 111, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This proposal, commonly referred to as 
the Bumpers Amendment, provides for a higher standard of judicial review for adminis- 
trative agency rulemaking. This bill has taken amendment form on several occasions. See 
the Sept. 7,1979 amendment of Senator Bumpers to Senate bill 1477, the Federal Courts 
Improvements Act, 125 CONG. REC. S12,145 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979), and the Oct. 30, 
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Unfortunately, the increasing volume and complexity of 
cases is not the sole problem. Statistics concerning caseloads and 
the concomitant administrative responsibility to preside over a 
case until final disposition do not tell the entire story of the role 
played by the federal judiciary. These statistics merely measure 
the traditional aspect of what courts do: that is, resolve contro- 
versies in an adversary setting. When assessing the burdens on 
federal judges, it is important to recognize that courts now and 
in the past have engaged in a broad spectrum of nonadjudicative 
endeavors. These functions, which have also escalated with time, 
add substantial administrative problems. Their impact is cer- 
tainly felt by an Article I11 judge during the normal workday. 
These nonadjudicative responsibilities may conveniently be 
organized into four categories: legislative, executive, administra- 
tive, and ceremonial. In the legislative context, Congress gener- 
ally has assigned the judiciary a significant rulemaking author- 
 it^.'^ At the trial level, court rules have been adopted by most 
district courts; similarly, every court of appeals has issued 
rules.s0 Moreover, Congress specifically has given the courts re- 
sponsibility for devising plans for the administration of the 
Criminal Justice Act,"' the Jury Selection and Service Act:2 and 
the Speedy Trial Act.= These latter activities relate to the criti- 
cally importantto Congress, at leastiimplementation of laws 
governing the judicial system. The courts also act as general su- 
pervisors of the legal professi~n.~ 
As to the executive powers of the judicial branch, Congress 
has delegated responsibility to make appointments to judicial'l5 
1980 amendment to House of Representatives bill 3806, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit Act, 125 CONG. REc. S13,877 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1980) (Part 11). 
29. The overall authority of the federal judiciary to promulgate rules is found in two 
enabling acts, cdified in 18 U.S.C. 8 3771 (1976) (criminal procedure) and 28 U.S.C. 5 
2072 (1976) (civil procedure). Congress has retained some residual authority to reject or 
modify rules. 
30. See generally Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 
COLUM. L. REV. 905, 906 (1976). 
31. Pub. L. No. 88-455, 8 2, 78 Stat. 552 (1964), (current version at 18 U.S.C. 5 
3006A(a) (1976)). 
32. Pub. L. No. 90-274, 8 101, 82 Stat. 54 (1968), (current version at 28 U.S.C. $3 
1861-1875 (1976)). 
33. Pub. L. No. 93-619, tit. I, 8 101, 88 Stat. 2076 (1973), (current version at 18 
U.S.C. 55 3161-3174 (1976)). 
34. See FED. R. APP. P. 46; ~ T H  CIK R. 27. 
35. See 28 U.S.C. 8 631(a) (Supp. I11 1979) (magistrates); 11 U.S.C. 5 62 (1976) 
(bankruptcy referees). The latter appointive power will terminate on April 1, 1984, the 
effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
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and executiveM branch positions. Often this appointive power is 
structured with somewhat rigid statutory procedures and merit 
selection standards.s7 
In the area of nonadjudicative administrative authority, 
Congress has given the courts the specific responsibility of issu- 
ing electronic eavesdropping orders:8 managing the grand jury? 
overseeing plea bargaining:O and sentencing convicted 
criminals? To help the judiciary carry out these functions, Con- 
gress has created at least one special court4' and has authorized 
the creation of institutes and joint councils on senten~ing.~. 
As to ceremonial functions, federal judges continue to natu- 
ralize aliensU and, on occasion, to conduct  marriage^.^^ Further, 
judges often administer oaths to newly appointed or elected offi- 
c i a l ~ . ~ ~  Records usually have to be kept of these actions, impos- 
ing yet another burden on the courts. 
In short, anyone who wants to discuss the administrative 
problems of the federal judiciary must recognize that federal 
judges are "charged with a large number of official responsibili- 
ties that do not fall within the adjudicatory role of dispute re- 
s o l v e ~ " ~ ~  These nonadjudicative functions add altogether differ- 
ent responsibilities and problems to a judge's agenda. Because a 
36. 28 U.S.C. 8 546 (1976) provides that when the office of United States Attorney is 
vacant, the district court may make an interim appointment. However, the President 
still retains the authority to remove such a temporary U.S. attorney. 28 U.S.C. 8 541(c) 
(1976). 
In addition, pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act, the Chief Justice of the 
United States assigns three judges or justices to a special division of the District of Co- 
lumbia Circuit for the purpose of appointing "special prosecutors." 28 U.S.C. $3 49,591- 
598 (Supp. I11 1979). 
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(b) (Supp. I11 1979) (appointment of U.S. magistrates). 
38. 18 U.S.C. g 2518 (1976) (amended 1978). 
39. 18 U.S.C. $8 3331-3333 (1976). 
40. See FED. R. GRIM. P. ll(e); see also 18 U.S.C. 8 3575 (1976). 
41. At present, there is no general federal sentencing law. Criminal code proposals 
are all in agreement that there sh'ould be a comprehensive statutory statement on sen- 
tencing. See S. 1722,95th Cong., 2d Sess. @ 2001-2306 (1980); H.R. 6915,96th Cong., 2d 
SW. 54 3101-3708 (1980). 
42. 50 U.S.C. 5 1803 (Supp. I11 1979). 
43. 28 U.S.C. 5 334 (1976). See ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 55 7.1-7.2 (Approved 
Draft 1968). 
44. 8 U.S.C. $8 1447-1450 (1976). 
45. This is done pursuant to local statute. 
46. See, e.g., U.S.CONST. art. 11, 5 1, cl. 7. 
47. Schwartz, The Other Things That Courts Do 1 (1980) (unpublished paper pre- 
pared for the Council on the Role of Courts, Washington, D.C.). 
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judge's time is finite, the effective handling of these obligations 
may conflict with what is perceived to be the principal task of 
lifetime-tenured judges-resolving disputes in an adversary 
setting.48 
In response to the federal judiciary's multiple responsibili- 
ties (some of which are imposed by legislation and others of 
which are created by the courts themselves), the court reform- 
ers' constant hue and cry has been "Create more judgeships," or, 
in the alternative, "Give the judges more support personnel." 
Congress has acted again and again, passing omnibus judgeship 
bills, increasing the powers of subordinate judicial officers, and 
granting judges more staff support.4a Even taking into considera- 
tion the augmented number of judgeships, during the past 
twenty-five years the ratio of total judicial branch staff to judges 
(including retired judges) has increased over fifty percent?O 
As the district and circuit courte' judge and staff resources 
have increased, there has been an equal-if not greater-growth 
in the amount of administrative work imposed on these courts. 
And, ominously, the pending case backlog has actually risen. An 
apt analogy is the phenomenon that occurs when transportation 
experts act to alleviate downtown traffic congestion by building 
more parking lots. Often, the solution is only short-term, and 
over the long-run congestion worsens because more people drive 
their  automobile^.^^ 
48. Hearings on the State of the Judiciary, supra note 2, at 112-13 (statement of 
Burt Neuborne), 150-53 (statement of Shirley M. Hufstedler). 
49. See, e.g., The Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486,92 Stat. 1629, 
which authorized the addition of 117 district judges and 35 circuit judges to the federal 
judiciary. 
But see Hearings on the State of the Judiciary, supra note 2, at 251 (Statement of 
Robert H. Bork): "[Mly belief is that the Federal judiciary is now too large as it stands." 
In its report on the omnibus judgeship bill, the House Committee on the judiciary 
found that the federal judiciary cannot be expanded interminably without endangering 
its high quality. H.R. REP. NO. 95-858, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978). 
50. In 1954 the ratio of staff to judges was eleven to one; in 1980 it was seventeen to 
one. Rubin, supra note 22, at 651. These figures refer not only to in-chambers staff, but 
also to supporting personnel such as probation officers and the staffs of clerks' offices. By 
an even greater proportion, Congress has increased the budget of the federal judiciary. I .  
fiscal year 1961 the total budget, excluding the Supreme Court, was $48,325,700, the 
total for fiscal year 1980 was $578,959,000, a nearly twelvefold increase. [I9601 DIRECTOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 189; [I9791 DIRECTOR ADMINISTRATIVE OF- 
FICE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 36. 
51. For a similar view, see Haworth & Meador, A Proposed New Federal Intermedi- 
ate Appellate Court, 12 U .  MCH. JL. REF. 201, 209 (1978). See also Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1979: Addendum to Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 Before the Sub- 
comm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
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President Jimmy Carter understood that creating more 
judgeships was only a partial remedy to the difficulties facing 
the federal judiciary. In a message to Congress he observed, 
[Ulnless we improve the system of justice itself, we may find 
that the additional judges have been swallowed up by outmo- 
ded procedures and by an ever-rising volume of cases. We must 
take prompt and effective steps to eliminate the remaining ob- 
stacles to efficiency in the justice system and to increase access 
to Federal courts by those with Federal claims.6g 
Already, this has proved to be true. The short-term solution of 
increasing the size of the federal judiciary by adding judges and 
staff has forced many judges, especially chief judges at the cir- 
cuit and district level, to assume more and more administrative 
responsibility, thereby diminishing their abilities to adjudicate 
cases or, in the alternative, forcing them to delegate ministerial 
functions to  subordinate^.^^ 
Delegation creates a whole new host of problems. It requires 
active management and quality control by the delegating au- 
thority. If not monitored properly and if not assigned to a quali- 
fied individual, delegation may not save time or contribute to 
responsible decisionmaking. Haphazard and ill-managed delega- 
tion has resulted in inconsistent treatment of similar adminis- 
trative issues throughout the federal judicial system. The way in 
which delegation has occurred has also often concealed the iden- 
tity of the decision-maker who should be held accountable if the 
system is not working properly. 
Nonetheless, delegation of administrative responsibility 
under well-monitored and well-managed circumstances is clearly 
preferable to diminishing the role that tenured federal judges 
are so well equipped to fulfill: 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1979) (statement of Daniel J. Meador). 
For an excellent analysis of the problems posed by the creation of federal judge- 
ships, see C. BUR, JUDGESHIP CREATION I  THE FEDERAL COURTS: OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
(Federal Judicial Center 1981). The gist of Professor Baar's proposal is that if a few 
parking spaces were added on an annual basis when the need arose, it would not frus- 
trate the ability of the public to shift from the automobile to alternatives. Opening the 
floodgates on a periodic basis, however, raises expectations to a high pitch and encour- 
ages more flooding. 
52. Presidential Message of February 27,1979, reprinted in Diversity of Citizenship 
JurisdictionlMagistrates Reform: Hearings on Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/ 
Magistrates Reform Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Ad- 
ministration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 
(1979). 
53. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 2, at 30. 
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adjudicating disputes in traditional Federal subject matter ar- 
eas such as copyright, patents, trademarks, commerce, bank- 
ruptcy, antitrust, and admiralty; rendering speedy criminal jus- 
tice for those accused of crimes; protecting the basic civil and 
constitutions1 liberties of all citizens; and resolving vital and 
often recently identified rights (and sometimes rights not yet 
identified by the legislative branch) which relate to welfare, oc- 
cupational safety, the environment, consumerism, and 
privacy.* 
There is nothing in the constitutional debates or the two-hun- 
dred-year history of the federal judiciary to indicate that Article 
111 judges, appointed by the President with the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate and equipped with judicial tenure, are to 
spend their working time making routine administrative deci- 
sions. What is clear is that from the beginning days of this coun- 
try the revolutionary idea was that the judiciary was to protect 
the rights of citizens and to establish justice under law." In- 
creasing administrative demands may prohibit the judges from 
having the time to carry out these traditional responsibilities. 
Thus, the caseload explosion and the large increases in the 
number of court personnel have placed pressures on the federal 
judicial system never imagined by those who drafted the Consti- 
tution? As a result new burdens have been placed on the 
courts' administrative structure, not a single element of which, 
with the exception of the office of the Chief Justice of the 
United States, existed at the beginning of the 20th century. 
These pressures imperil the judiciary's ability to effectively per- 
form the basic functions given it by the framers of the 
Constitution. 
54. H.R. REP. NO. 95-893, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978). 
55. Madison explained in the Federalist Papers: "Justice is the end of government. 
I t  is the end of civil society. I t  ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be ob- 
tained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit." THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at  350-51 (J. 
Madison). See abo THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (A. Hamilton). 
56. Former Vice-president Mondale put it plainly: 
We operate under a judicial structure largely unchanged 'from the one designed 
200 years ago for a handful of new Americans in 13 small states on the eastern 
seaboard. We expect the same system, today, to meet the needs of 210 million 
very different kinds of people spread over 53 separate jurisdictions in the most 
modern and complex society ever seen on the face of the globe. 
Address by W. Mondale to the Second Judicial Circuit Conference (Sept. 10, 1977), re- 
printed in Hearings on the State of the Judiciary, supra note 2, at  794. 
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The growing adjudicative and administrative obligations of 
the federal judiciary should be placed in historical context; it is 
helpful to ponder past experiences before turning to present 
problems and before trying to formulate solutions for the future. 
Long ago Maitland observed, "To-day we study the day before 
yesterday, in order that yesterday may not paralyse to-day, and 
to-day may not paralyse to-morrow."" To paraphrase Professor 
Bickel, a knowledge of the past can assist us to "remember the 
future."58 
A. Early Development 
During the early days-indeed during the first one hundred 
years-of the federal judiciary, there was not much concern 
about judicial administration. The workload was relatively low 
and the numbers of judges and subordinates were well within 
manageable limits? 
With the development of the modern industrial state, how- 
ever, came new and unforeseen pressures on the courts and the 
legal profession. The last three decades of the 19th Century, in 
this and other countries, were a period of rapid social, economic, 
and technological changee60 The influence of the railroad, devel- 
opment of mass communication, expansion of the factory system 
and of commercial organizations, shifts in the social environ- 
ment, and diversification of social conciousness all placed tre- 
mendous burdens on the legal system, whose job it was to direct 
and organize these changes.61 
In spite of the new problems that were fast being pressed on 
the courts, the need to improve judicial machinery was not im- 
mediately recognized. Ultimately, however, congressional per- 
ception that the judicial vessel was in danger of running aground 
was coupled with a consensus solution, and in 1891 Congress 
57. 3 F. MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS 439 (Fisher ed. 1911). 
58. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 102 (1970). 
59. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 336-38 (1973); Frank, Justice 
Tom Clark and Judicial Administration, 46 fix. L. REV. 5, 8 (1967). 
60. J. HURST, supra note 6, at 9. European countries were experiencing similar 
changes and their court systems were being subjected to the same stresses. By way of 
illustration, the caseload of the French Council of State tripled between 1878 and 1908. 
LE CONSEIL ~'ETAT 676-77 (1974). 
61. See J. HURST, supra note 6, at 15-19. 
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passed legislation that created nine intermediate courts of ap- 
peals and further defined the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
United States.62 
In 1906 Roscoe Pound, in a classic address to the American 
Bar Association, charged that the American justice system was 
no longer meeting its assigned functions. He concluded that de- 
fects in our judicial system were high among the causes of citi- 
zen dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.6s The legal 
profession and the legislative branch were loath to accept 
Pound's challenge." In fact, there was a concerted effort to pre- 
vent the speech from ever being printed? 
Nonetheless, a seed had been planted and that seed 
reached maturity sixteen years later. Under the patient and 
watchful care of Chief Justice, and former President, William 
Howard Taft, legislation was passed in 1922. The legislation fur- 
thered two objectives supported by the Chief J u s t i ~ e . ~ ~  First, the 
legislation clothed the Chief Justice with the authority to take 
certain specific actions to meet the changing needs of the federal 
courts. For example, he was given authority to assign district 
court judges to serve anywhere in the country, provided there 
was a certificate of need from the circuit requesting assistance 
and a certificate of availability from the circuit providing the 
helping hand?' The involvement of the circuits was noteworthy 
because it demonstrated an early congressional awareness of the 
politically significant factor of localism or decentralization. 
Second, the 1922 Act established the Conference of Senior 
Circuit Judges (today known as the Judicial Conference of the 
United  state^).^^ The conference was given general responsibil- 
62. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
63. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Jus- 
tice, 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964) (address to the American Bar Association, Aug. 26, 1906, at St. 
Paul, Minnesota). 
64. Members of the organized bar were so outraged that they accused Pound of at- 
tempting "to destroy that which the wisdom of the centuries has built up." Wigmore, 
Roscoe Pound's St. Paul Address of 1906, 20 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 176, 177 (1936) (quoting 
Mr. Spoonts of Texas). But, within one year, the ABA apparently agreed with Pound. 
This led to the appointment of a special committee which was assigned the task of exam- 
ining existing evils in judicial administration and then proposing remedies to cure those 
evils. Pound was one of the committee's members. See 31 A.B.A. REP. 505 (1907); 34 
A.B.A. REP. 578 (1909). 
65. Wigmore, supra note 64, at  177. 
66. See Myers, Origin of the Judicial Conference, 57 A.B.A.J. 597 (1971). 
67. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, 5 3, 42 Stat. 837. 
68. Id. 5 2. As part of a general recodification of title 28 of the United States Code, 
the Judicial Conference of the United States was renamed in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948, 
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ity to make a comprehensive survey of the condition of business 
in the federal courts, to prepare plans for the transfer and tem- 
porary assignment of judges to meet varying docket demands, 
and to submit to Congress suggestions concerning uniformity 
and the expedition of the federal courts' bu~iness.~@ 
Considered collectively, these two changes comprised the 
first statutory effort in this nation's history to treat the federal 
judicial system as a single entity.1° Although it was a significant 
step forward, this initial reform quickly exposed a need for fur- 
ther congressional action. The Judicial Conference met only 
once a year and lacked an administrative st&. It  was thus una- 
ble to effectively discharge its responsibilities. For example, 
without a comprehensive, reliable system of statistics, it was vir- 
tually impossible to identify and devise solutions to court 
problems. 
As a consequence, seventeen years later-on joint resolution 
of the Attorney General and the Judicial Conference, with active 
support from Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes-Congress ac- 
ted again," passing the Administrative Office Act of 1939, prob- 
ably the greatest judicial administrative package ever passed in 
this nation's history.7a 
B. The Administrative Offiee Act of 1939 
By enacting the Administrative Office Act of 1939, Congress 
achieved at least three major objectives. First, an entirely new 
institutionthe Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts-was created to assume the responsibility of administer- 
ch. 646, 62 Stat. 902. 
69. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, # 2, 42 Stat. 837. 
70. J. HURST, supra note 6, at  114. 
71. Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501,53 Stat. 1223 (codified at 28 U.S.C. $8 332-333, 456, 
601-610 (1976)). 
For an excellent history of this legislation, see P. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 125-65 (1973). See also Administration of United States 
Courts: Hearings on H.R. 2973 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1939) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on Administration of U.S. Courts]. 
72. The House Report recognized this by stating, "[Ilt is believed by many of the 
bench, bar, and laity that the pending bill is the most important ever presented to Con- 
gress for the improvement of Federal judicature." H. R. REP. NO. 702, 76th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 4 (1939). An illustrious court reformer understated while testifying on the proposed 
legislation: "This bill seems very general and very gentle . . ., but I think it has teeth in 
it that are longer and will cut deeper, if necessary, than you would suspect at  first read- 
ing." House Hearings on Administration of U S .  Courts, supra note 71, at 27 (statement 
of Arthur T. Vanderbilt). 
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ing the federal courts, including the preparation of the judici- 
ary's budget." The Administrative Office was also given the re- 
sponsibility for gathering statistics about the federal courts' 
workload. The Director of the Administrative Office was asked 
to report these statistics annually to both the Congress and the 
Judicial ConferenceJ4 In addition, the Judicial Conference's own 
authority was augmented by giving it supervisory authority over 
the Administrative Office.76 
Second, by what has been characterized as a "magic touch 
of decentralization,"le the Act created another new institution: 
the judicial council of the circuits, or circuit councils." Com- 
posed of the active circuit judges of each circuit, the circuit 
councils were asked to work for the effective and expeditious 
transaction of the business of the circuit's various courts.78 The 
Act further directed the circuit's district judges to promptly 
carry into effect all orders of the circuit council and increased 
the circuit's chief judge's responsibility by requiring him to pre- 
side over the council's semi-annual meeting.19 
Third, the legislation provided that there be a judicial con- 
ference in each circuit made up of all the circuit's district and 
circuit judges, together with designated members of the bar. The 
conference was given the broad mandate of reviewing the cir- 
cuit's business and studying how the administration of justice 
therein might be improved. The conference's actions were to be 
communicated to the circuit council, which was empowered to 
respond ac~ordingly.~~ 
73. This was previously the responsibility of the Justice Department. 
74. Act of Aug. 7,1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, 5 305,53 Stat. 1223, 1224 (codified a t  28 
U.S.C. $5 601, 604 (1976)). 
75. Id. 5 305 (codified a t  28 U.S.C. 5 604(a) (1976)). 
76. M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 687 (1951). 
77. See Act of Aug. 7, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, 5 306, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified a t  28 
U.S.C. 5 332 (1976)). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. Until the Judicial Councils Reform Act was passed in 1980, the original 1939 
provision (codified at 28 U.S.C. 5 332 (1976)) essentially remained unchanged. Only two 
amendments of note occurred. The first was in 1948, as part of a general recodification of 
title 28. The most important language change was adoption of the phrase that "[elach 
judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious adminis- 
tration of the business of the courts within the circuit." 28 U.S.C. $ 332(d) (1976). The 
Reviser's Note indicated that this was just a change in "phraseology." H.R. REP. NO. 308, 
80th Cong., 1st Sess. A46 (1947). The second change was in 1971, with enactment of the 
Circuit Executive Act. See notes 85-87 and accompanying text infra. 
80. See Act of Aug. 7, 1939, Pub. L. No. 299, ch. 501, 5 306, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified 
a t  28 U.S.C. 5 333 (1976)). 
CIRCUIT COUNCIL REFORM 
C.  Recent Reforms and Present Structure 
After the enactment of the Administrative Office Act of 
1939, nearly three decades went by before passage of the next 
major reform. In 1967 the Federal Judicial Center was created.81 
Established as a separate entity within the judicial branch, the 
Center was given responsibilities over research, judicial training, 
and system devel~pment.~~ The legislation provided that the 
Center would be the source of recommendations to Congress, to 
the Judicial Conference, and to the legal community in general.s3 
The Act also created a Federal Judicial Center governing board, 
chaired by the Chief Justice, and composed of the Director of 
the Administrative Office and five judges elected by the Judicial 
C~nference.~~ 
Shortly thereafter, in 1971, another judicial administation 
reform occurred with the enactment of the Circuit Executive 
The Act provided the chief judge of the circuit and the 
circuit council with a court executive authorized to exercise vari- 
ous administrative responsibilities.se The enacted legislation spe- 
cifically envisioned that the new court officer-the circuit execu- 
tive-would act as an arm of the circuit council. It further 
anticipated that this court administrator would assist the court 
of appeals in improving its internal management and 
organizati~n.~~ 
The present administrative structure of the federal judiciary 
81. Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, 8 101, 81 Stat. 664 (codified a t  28 
U.S.C. 5 620 (1976)). For an excellent paper on the creation of the Federal Judicial 
Center, see Address by R. Wheeler, The Creation of the Federal Judicial Center as a 
Case Study of Innovation, Autonomy, and Control in Judicial Administration (June 5-8, 
1980) (Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Madison, Wisconsin). 
82. 28 U.S.C. 5 620 (1976). See also S. REP. NO. 90-781,90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), 
reprinted in [I9671 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2402. 
83. 28 U.S.C. 5 620 (1976). 
84. Id. 8 621. 
85. Pub. L. No. 91-647, 84 Stat. 1907 (1971) (codified a t  28 U.S.C. 5 332(e)-(f) 
(1976)). 
86. Id. See also S. REP. NO. 91-1511, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in [I9701 
U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEWS 5876. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, added a sixth judge to the Center's Board. 
87. As enunciated by the Senate Judiciary Committee, "improved management of 
the courts should have a substantial effect on the ability of judges to perform their judi- 
cial function without having to spend significant time on court administration." S. REP. 
No. 91-1511, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970), reprinted in [I9701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 5876, 5878. 
For more information about circuit executives, see J. MCDERMOTT & S. FLANDERS, 
. THE IMPACT OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE ACT (Federal Judicial Center 1979). 
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has developed as described in this brief history? Its general 
characteristics are as follows. First, it is a total ecosystem cover- 
ing the entire federal judicial system; a change in one part of the 
structure creates aftershocks felt throughout. Second, it exists 
within the judicial branch of government and it is judge-con- 
trolled. It is therefore consistent with constitutional dictates of 
separation of powers because it promotes and protects the inde- 
pendence of the judiciary. Third, it is a decentralized system 
with significant elements of localism and personalism. Fourth, 
its formal organization is pyramidal. At the apex is the Judicial 
Conference of the United States and its chairman, the Chief 
Justice of the United States. The twelve circuit councils, chaired 
by the chief judges of the circuits, are midway down the pyra- 
mid. The circuit executives and the judicial conferences of the 
circuit accompany the circuits' chief judges at this midway level. 
The district judges, for the most part lacking system-wide ad- 
ministrative authority (except to the extent that they participate 
in circuit and Judicial Conference affairs), are of course at the 
base of the pyramid. The Administrative Office of the United 
States Cowts provides centralized staff assistance to the entire 
structure. And the Federal Judicial Center provides a critically 
needed education, development, and research component. 
It is within this framework that future attempts to improve 
judicial administration will be brought before the Congress. 
The federal circuit council, a relatively unknown judicial in- 
stitution, has already been subjected to insightful analysis.8e 
Nonetheless, the reasons for the initial 1939 legislation creating 
the judicial councils need to be emphasized and some of the in- 
tervening problems identified in order to provide a basis for dis- 
88. In spite of dramatic changes in the number of judges and court personnel, 
caseload (both in terms of numbers and complexity), and jurisdiction, the administrative 
structure of the federal judiciary has remained remarkably stable. Meador, The Federal 
Judiciary and its Future Administration, 65 VA. L. REV. 1031 (1979). 
89. Two of the best law review articles on this subject are Fish, The Circuit Coun- 
cils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Administration, 37 U .  CHI. L. REV. 203 (1970), 
and Wallace, supra note 17. See also P. FISH, supra note 71, at 152-65 for a comprehen- 
sive and excellent analysis of the federal court system. For a thorough evaluation of the 
circuit councils, see S. FLANDERS & J. MCDERMOTT, OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
COUNCILS (1978), and Mr. Justice Harlan's minute examination of the history of the 
councils in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 US. 74, 96-104 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
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cussing the recently enacted Judicial Councils Reform Act. 
A. The Creation and Development of Circuit Councils 
The circuit councils were the handiwork of Chief Justice 
Hughes, who had the active support of the powerful Chairman 
of the House Judiciary Committee, Congressman Hatton Sum- 
ners.@" Chairman Sumners had been a manager for the House in 
the lengthy impeachment trial of Judge Halstead Ritter. From 
that experience Sumners concluded that there was a need for a 
better mechanism to discipline federal judges?' Chief Justice 
Hughes, for his part, was deeply committed to improving the 
overall administration of the business of the courts. Both men 
thought that a decentralized institution could be created-one 
that paid great attention to local authority and responsibility. 
At the 1938 session of the Judicial Conference, Hughes pro- 
posed the creation of a mechanism that would concentrate re- 
sponsibility in the circuits. The new entity would be assigned 
immediate responsibility for the work of the courts within the 
circuit. It would have the power and authority to do what was 
necessary to ensure competence in the work of the various dis- 
tricts within the circuit.92 
The Judicial Conference approved the Chief Justice's pro- 
posal in principle and asked a committee to prepare a legislative 
proposal "embracing a provision looking toward the establish- 
ment of judicial councils or some other like method within the 
several circuits and the District of Columbia for the control and 
improvement of the administration of justice therein.'" 
The bill was prepared, introduced, and ultimately enacted. 
The section relating to circuit councils was enacted precisely as 
it was proposed by the Judicial Conference. Emanual Celler, 
90. Fish, supra note 89, at  206. 
91. P. FISH, supra note 71, at  154. See 80 CONG. REC. 5468-73 (1936) (remarks of 
Rep. Sumners). After the impeachment of Judge Ritter, Chairman Sumners became an 
enthusiastic supporter of judicial discipline legislation. See, e.g., H.R. 2271, 75th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1937). 
It is noteworthy that the Halsted Ritter impeachment was the last successful re- 
moval of a federal judge from the bench. See STAFF OF IMPEACHMENT I QUIRY HOUSE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 9 3 ~ ~  CONG., 2~ SESS., REPORT ON CONSTIUTUTIONAL GROUNDS 
FOR PRESIDENTIAL ~PEACHMENT (1974). 
92. See Transcript of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference 174-92 (Sept. 30, 
1938). 
93. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE US. 12 (Sept. 
1938). 
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then a member and later Chairman of the House Judiciary Com- 
mittee, observed several years later: 
The language of title 28, United States Code, section 332 
was recommended to the Congress in 1939 by the judges them- 
selves and was deliberately worded in broad terms in order to 
confer broad responsibility and authority on the judicial coun- 
cils. It was the considered judgment of the Congress that the 
judicial councils were by their very nature the proper agents 
for supervisory management and administration of the Federal 
courts. The councils are close to all the courts of the circuit 
and know their needs better than anyone else and, by placing 
responsibility and authority in the councils of the circuits, ad- 
ministrative power in the judicial branch was decentralized, as 
it ought to be, and in each circuit kept in the hands of judges 
of the circuit.@' 
The legislative history of section 332 clearly indicates that 
delegation of substantial management power to the decentral- 
ized circuit councils was thought to be needed and was broadly 
granted." The 1939 legislation gave the councils authority to 
make corrective orders for the effective and expeditious adminis- 
tration of the business of the courts within the circuit. The dis- 
trict judges were directed to carry out all such orders. This was 
significant because the power to issue orders has never been 
grant&d to any other administrative entity in the federal 
jud ic ia r~ .~~  
By the late 1950's the effectiveness of the councils began to 
be seriously questioned. Then Circuit Judge Burger charged that 
the "Judicial Councils have not fully lived up to the expectation 
of the sponsors."s7 One noted scholar described the councils as 
94. Celler, Foreward to REPORT ON THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITES OF THE JUDI- 
CIAL COUNCILS H.R. Doc. No. 201, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. v-vi (1961). 
95. The following colloquy between Chief Judge John J. Parker and Congressman 
Celler illustrates the intent to give the councils broad powers. Congressman Celler ques- 
tioned: "Do you put any restraint on the council at all?" 
Judge Parker answered: "I do not think this bill does." House Hearings on Adminis- 
tration of U.S. Courts, supra note 71, at 22. 
Another federal judge thought that the legislation conferred upon the councils au- 
thority to examine a problem and to take "such action as may be necessary to coniect 
such a situation." Id. at 11 (statement of D. Lawrence Groner). 
96. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1979) (statement of Daniel J. Meador). 
97. Burger, The Courts on Trial, 22 F.R.D. 71, 77 (1958) (address by Warren E. 
Burger, American Bar Association Southern Regional Meeting, Feb. 21, 1958). In 1959 a 
Senate staff report accused the circuit councils of failing to assist in the direction of the 
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"pillars of passivity."" A United States Senator accused the 
councils of being relatively impotent in meeting their 
~bligations.~~ 
When a case involving the authority of a circuit council 
finally reached the Supreme Court, the Court found existing lan- 
guage concerning the circuit councils' powers to be ambiguous. 
In Chandler v. Judicial Council,loO the Supreme Court upheld 
two orders of the circuit council of the Tenth Circuit, the first 
finding a district judge unable or unwilling to discharge his du- 
ties efficiently and directing him to refrain from sitting on any 
further cases, and the second superseding the first and authoriz- 
ing the judge to sit only on cases assigned to him before a cer- 
tain date. 
In upholding the orders the Court avoided the serious issue 
of whether the council's orders were administrative in nature 
and therefore not subject to judicial review.lol However, the 
Court did discuss in dicta the delicate balance that must be 
achieved between the need for judicial independence and the ex- 
igency for judicial administration. The author of the majority 
opinion, Chief Justice Burger, asked the rhetorical question, 
"[Clan each judge be an absolute monarch and yet have a com- 
plex judicial system function efficiently?"lo2 In an unequivocal 
and compelling response, the Chief Justice answered 
negatively. lo8 
In an important footnote, again in dicta, the Chief Justice 
administration of the business of the United States courts. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON 
APPROPRIATIONS, 8 6 ~ ~  CONG., 2~ SESS., FIELD STUDY OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 33-36 (Comm. Print 1959). 
98. P. FISH, supra note 71, at 404. 
99. Federal Courts and Judges: Hearings on S. 952 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 350 (1969) (Letter from Joseph D. 
Tydings). 
Justice Tom Clark also levelled criticism at the councils. Clark, The Federal Judi- 
cial Center-New Hope for the Courts, 36 DISTRICT COLUM. B.J. 32, 32 (1969). 
100. 398 U.S. 74 (1970). 
101. Id. at 89. 
102. Id. at 85. 
103. Id. Chief Justice Burger concluded: "[Ilf one judge in any system refuses to 
abide by such reasonable procedures it can hardly be that the extraordinary machinery 
of impeachment is the only recourse." Id. For further discussion of whether impeach- 
ment is the exclusive constitutional method for disciplining and removing federal judges, 
see Judicial Discipline and Tenure: Hearings on S. 295, S. 522, and S. 678 Before the 
Subcommittees on Judicial Machinery and Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-17 (1979) (statement of Eugene Gressman) [herein- 
after cited as Senate Hearings on Judicial Discipline and Tenure]. 
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criticized the drafting of section 332. 
Standing alone, § 332 is not a model of clarity in terms of the 
scope of the judicial councils' powers or the procedures to give 
effect to the final sentence of § 332. Legislative clarification of 
enforcement provisions of this statute and definition of review 
of Council orders are called for.lo4 
In a second meaty footnote, the Chief Justice supported the 
concept of granting the councils, as administrative bodies, broad 
authority to promote the effective and expeditious administra- 
tion of court business.lo6 This confirmed the 1939 legislation's 
original thesis that the circuit councils would become active par- 
ticipants in the management of judicial business within the cir- 
cuit similar to a board of directors.lO" 
The Supreme Court's call for congressional clarification of 
28 U.S.C. 5 332 went unheard or unheeded for several years.lo7 
Meanwhile, the councils continued to be involved in a wide vari- 
ety of judicial affairs. Congress continued to give the circuit 
councils a wide panoply of administrative responsibilities, view- 
ing them as empty receptacles into which .more authority could 
be poured. 
B. Authority of the Circuit Councils 
The statutory authority possessed by the circuit councils is 
of four distinct kinds: (1) the administration of the business of 
the courts; (2) the retirement, discipline, and appointment of 
certain judicial officers; (3) criminal justice administration; and 
(4) the implementation of legislation. These powers are not al- 
ways oft exercised; nor are they extremely time consuming when 
exercised. 
1.  Authority to Administer the Business of the Courts 
In the area-of administering the courts' business, congres- 
sional grants of authority to the circuit councils reflect a desire 
104. 398 U.S. at 85 n.6. 
105. Id. at 86 n.7. This footnote is also dicta. 
106. Id. Fur further discussion of Chandler, see Note, The Chandler Incident and 
Problems of Judicial Removal, 19 STAN. L. REV. 448 (1967). 
107. In the meantime, at least one circuit court held that section 332 passed constiu- 
titonal muster. In re Imperial "400" National, Inc., 481 F.2d 41, 45 (3d Cir.), cert. de- 
nied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973). See also Hilbert v. Dooling, 476 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1973), which 
broadly construed the councils' authority to reduce court delay. 
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to make the day-to-day work of the district courts more efficient, 
to provide a reviewing body for certain district court administra- 
tive decisions, and to allow circuit council intercession when 
there is an inability to agree at  the district level on various ad- 
ministr ative matters. Statutory illustrations are numerous. Cir - 
cuit councils review district court plans for the rindom selection 
of grand and petit jurors.lo8 Councils must consent to a district 
court decision to pretermit the holding of any regular session of 
court.lO@ When district judges are unable to agree upon the 
adoption of rules or orders dividing the business of the court, 
the circuit council must intercede and make the necessary or- 
ders.l1° The circuit council can even get involved in deciding 
where a district judge lives. The council may, by appropriate or- 
der, designate the residence of a district judge at or near a par- 
ticular place within the district if the public interest and the na- 
ture of the district court's business so require. If the district 
judges are unable to decide among themselves who shall live in 
the designated place, the circuit council may make this 
decision. l1 l 
In a similar vein, the council may designate the depository 
for the courts' records.ll' The council also may get involved in 
decisions relating to court quarters and accomrn~dations.~~~ In 
addition, the council shares authority with the chief judge of the 
circuit to designate and assign a retired circuit or district judge 
to perform such additional duties within the circuit as he is will- 
ing and able to undertake.l14 Finally, when the chief judge of 
any district court requests additional court reporters, the circuit 
council may notify the Director of the Administrative Office, 
who arranges for additional reporters on a contract basis.l15 
2. Authority to Retire, Discipline, and Appoint Judicial 
Officers 
Congress has provided the circuit councils with extensive 
108. 28 U.S.C. 5 1863 (1976). 
109. 28 U.S.C. 140(a) (1976). 
110. 28 U.S.C. 5 137 (1976). See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1104 (10th 
Cir. 1972); Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972). 
111. 28 U.S.C. 5 134(c) (1976). 
112. 28 U.S.C. 457 (1976). 
113. 28 U.S.C. 5 142 (Supp. I11 1979). The councils' authority, in this regard, was 
augmented by the Act of Nov. 19, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-196, 91 Stat. 1420. 
114. 28 U.S.C. 5 294(c) (1976). 
115. 28 U.S.C. 5 753(g) (1976). 
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statutory authority with respect to the retirement, discipline, 
and appointment of judicial officers. For example, the councils 
have a great deal of authority over the United States magistrates 
system. The councils advise the Judicial Conference about the 
numbers, locations, and salaries of these important judicial of- 
ficers.l16 Although a district court may, by a concurrence of a 
majority of the district judges, remove a magistrate for cause, 
when the vote to remove is tied the magistrate may be removed 
by the circuit council.l17 Further, pursuant to the Federal Magis- 
trate Act of 1979,118 which set forth merit selection standards 
and procedures for the appointment of magistrates, the circuit 
councils were authorized to conduct certification inquiries for 
previously appointed magistrates to determine whether these 
magistrates are qualified to exercise the expanded trial jurisdic- 
tion conferred by the Act?@ 
The circuit councils also possess authority over other judi- 
cial officers. Until April 1, 1984,120 the councils will continue to 
advise the Director of the Administrative Office as to the num- 
ber of bankruptcy judges.'" If a district court is unable to de- 
cide on the removal of a bankruptcy judge, the council may in- 
tercede and order removal.12' After April 1, 1984, removal of a 
bankruptcy judge will be by a majority of the judges on the cir- 
cuit council of the circuit in which the bankruptcy judge 
Before an order of removal can occur, a full specifica- 
tion of the charges must be provided to the judge, who must 
then be accorded the right to be heard by the c0unci1.l~~ 
The circuit councils also have statutory authority to appoint 
a circuit executive, to delegate such administrative powers to the 
116. 28 U.S.C. Q 633(b) (1976). 
117. 28 U.S.C. Q 631(i) (Supp. I11 1979). Pursuant to section three of the Judicial 
Councils Reform Act, a complaint against a magistrate can be reported to the circuit 
council, which has the power to investigate and order various remedial actions, except 
that removal must be in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 631. Pub. L. No. 96-458, Q 3, 94 
Stat. 2035 (1980). 
118. Pub. L. NO. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643. 
119. Id. Q 3(f). 
120. This is the effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, QQ 
402, 404, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
121. 11 U.S.C. Q 65(b)(l) (1976). 
122. Id. Q 62(b). 
123. See 28 U.S.C. Q 153(b) (Supp. I11 1979). Pursuant to the Judicial Councils Re- 
form Act, a complaint against a bankruptcy judge can be reported to the circuit council, 
which can investigate and order remedial action, with the exception that removal must 
be in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 5 153. Pub. L. No. 96-458, Q 3, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980). 
124. 28 U.S.C. Q 153(b) (Supp. I11 1979). 
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executive as is deemed advisable, and to approve necessary em- 
ployees hired by the circuit executive. The circuit executive 
serves at the pleasure of the circuit council.la6 
Finally, upon receiving a certificate of physical or mental 
disability signed by a majority of the members of the circuit 
council, the President, with the advice and consent of the Sen- 
ate, may appoint an additional judge to replace any judge in the 
circuit who is eligible, but refuses, to retire.lw 
3. Authority to Administer Criminal Justice 
The councils play an important role in the administration of 
the Criminal Justice Actl2' and the Speedy Trial Act.'" Under 
the former, the councils are statutorily required to approve the 
district courts' plans to furnish representation to individuals 
financially unable to secure adequate legal counsel.129 Addition- 
ally, the councils, after considering suggestions from the district 
courts, appoint federal public defendersls0 and determine the 
rate of compensation and the number of employees hired by 
these public defenders.lsl 
Pursuant to the express language of the Speedy Trial Act, 
the councils-assisted by at  least one judge from the district 
court whose plan is being reviewed-must approve plans pre- 
pared to achieve the prompt disposition of criminal cases. If a 
district court is unable to comply with the time limits prescribed 
by the Speedy Trial Act, the district's chief judge may apply to 
the council for a temporary suspension of these limits.'" In de- 
ciding whether to grant a suspension request, "[tlhe judicial 
council of the circuit shall evaluate the capabilities of the dis- 
trict, the availability of visiting judges from within and without 
the circuit, and make any recommendations it deems appropri- 
ate to alleviate calendar congestion resulting from the lack of 
125. 28 U.S.C. 5 332(e)(f) (1976). 
126. 28 U.S.C. 5 372(b) (1976). 
127. Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (1964) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 5 3006A (1976)). 
128. Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1974) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 33 3161-3174 
(Supp. 1979)). See also Amendments to Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 96-43, 93 
Stat. 327. 
129. 18 U.S.C. 5 3006A(a) (1976). 
130. Id. 5 3006A(h)(2)(A). 
131. Id. The circuit council also may remove a public defender for incompetency, 
misconduct in office, or neglect of duty. Id. 
132. 28 U.S.C. 3 3174(c) (Supp. I11 1979). 
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4. Authority to Implement Legislation 
Increasingly, Congress has asked judges to become inti- 
mately involved in the administrative implementation of legisla- 
tion. In part because they serve as links between the trial and 
appellate courts and in part because of their power to issue or- 
ders, the circuit councils "occupy an ideal position for supervis- 
ing implementation of legislation."lM 
The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968,1a5 which estab- 
lished the goal of eliminating discrimination in the selection and 
service of jurors,'" requires every district court to formulate a 
written plan that ensures randomness in the compilation of 
names of prospective jurors. The councils are assigned the man- 
agerial role of monitoring and reviewing the plans, with ultimate 
authority lodged in the Judicial Conference.la7 Similar imple- 
mentation responsibility is delegated to the councils in the 
Criminal Justice Act1= and the Speedy Trial Act.lSe 
5. Nonstatutory Authority 
In addition to the responsibilities statutorily assigned to the 
circuit councils, the Judicial Conference has delegated additional 
duties to the councils, relying on both its own broad implement- 
ing authority and the councils' elastic statutory mandate to pro- 
mote the effective and expeditious administration of the busi- 
ness of the courts within the circuit. For example, the conference 
has asked the councils to develop plans for limiting publication 
of judicial opinions.140 In addition, the Conference considers the 
circuit council's recommendation when it evaluates the need for 
new judgeships.141 Moreover, all bills creating or changing a stat- 
133. Id. 
134. Kerwin, Judicial Implementation of Public Policy: The Courts and Legislation 
for the Judiciary, 16 Hmv. J. LEGIS. 415, 420 (1979). 
135. Pub. L. No. 90-274, 5 101, 82 Stat. 54 (current version at 28 U.S.C. $9 1861- 
1875 (Supp. 111 1979)). 
136. H.R. REP. NO. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [I9681 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1792, 1792. 
137. 28 U.S.C. 5 1863 (1976). 
138. 18 U.S.C. 5 3006A(a) (1976). 
139. 18 U.S.C. g 3165 (1976). 
140. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICUL CONFERENCE OF THE US. 5 
(March 1980). 
141. See, e.g., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONPERENCE OF THE 
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utory place of holding court or creating or changing a district or 
a division within a district must first be considered by the cir- 
cuit council for its rec~mmendation.~~~ 
The most significant grant of authority by the Judicial Con- 
ference to the circuit councils occurred in March of 1979 in the 
challenging and emotional area of creating a mechanism within 
the federal judiciary to consider complaints against misbehaving 
or disabled judges.141 After having thoroughly studied the issue 
and taken the unprecedented step of extending its scheduled 
meeting by an extra day in order to thoroughly study the issue, 
the Conference expressed its approval of the following princi- 
ples: (1) "The primary responsibility for dealing with a com- 
plaint against a United States judge should rest initially with 
'the chief judge of the circuit as presiding judge of the Judicial 
Council . . .,"I4' who has power to dismiss a complaint; (2) any 
complaint not dismissed by a chief judge should be referred to a 
committee appointed by the chief judge, the committee's find- 
ings and recommendations being reported to the circuit council; 
and (3) the circuit council should then order "such action as is 
appropriate to assure the effective and expeditious administra- 
tion of the business of the courts within the circuit," including 
referral of a complaint to the Judicial C ~ n f e r e n c e . ~ ~ ~  The Con- 
ference further resolved that the circuit councils should "con- 
sider the formulation and promulgation of rules of procedure for 
the receipt and processing of complaints against judges."14' 
This latter resolution was an unmistakable signal to the 
U.S. 37 (Sept. 1976). 
142. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 15 
(March 1961). This current Conference policy was formulated in part as a response to 
Chairman Emanuel Celler's 1959 request that the Conference study the adequacy of the 
then-existing places of holding court. See Federal District Court Organization Act of 
1978: Hearings on H.R. 12869 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
10, 11 (1978) (statement of Elmo B. Hunter). 
Further responsibilities delegated to the circuit councils by the Judicial Conference 
include deciding whether senior judges are entitled to supporting staff. REPORTS OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 21-22 (Sept. 1950). 
143. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 4-6 
(March 1979). This resolution is reprinted and discussed at  length in Hearings on Judi- 
cial Tenure, supra note 15, at  53-106 (testimony of Elmo B. Hunter, James R. Browning, 
and J. Clifford Wallace). 
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councils that they were responsible for handling complaints al- 
leging judicial misbehavior and disability."' In response to this 
resolution, every circuit council adopted formal rules of proce- 
dure for the receipt and processing of complaints against federal 
C.  The Need for Reform-Reasons Behind the Judicial 
Councils Reform Act 
In light of the dynamic developments discussed above, why 
was further legislation concerning judicial discipline still sought, 
found to be necessary, and ultimately enacted by a busy Con- 
gress? It should not be forgotton that the Judicial Conference's 
action, as well as the circuit council responses, did not occur in 
an intellectual vacuum. The judiciary was under substantial ex- 
ternal pressure to improve its own internal operating proce- 
dures. The United States Senate, on two occasions, had passed 
legislation that created mechanisms generally opposed by mem- 
bers of the federal judicial branch.14@ Further, in the post-Water- 
147. For a discussion of the role circuit councils played in handling complaints of 
judicial misbehavior and disability before the reform, see Ward, Can the Federal Courts 
Keep Order in their Own House? Appellate Supervision through Mandamus and Orders 
of Circuit Councils, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 233, 247-50. 
148. The circuit rules for the receipt and processing of complaints against judicial 
officers are reprinted in Hearings on Judicial Tenure, supra note 15, at 70-72, 373-456. 
At least one circuit has been publishing its circuit orders in the Federal Reports. 
See, e.g., In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 613 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Charge 
of Judicial Misconduct, 595 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Charge of Judicial Miscon- 
duct, 593 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1979). 
149. Although the Senate had toiled on judicial discipline legislation since the 
1930'9, it did not pass a bill until 1978. See S. 1423, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); 124 
CONG. REC. S14,745-49 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978). That bill, passed during the waning days 
of the 95th Congress, died a quiet death in the House of Representatives. At the advent 
of the 96th Congress, identical legislation was introduced in the Senate. See S. 295, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This bill, along with two other proposals (S. 522, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1979) and S. 678,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)) were considered during comprehen- 
sive hearings by a joint session of two subcommittees. Senate Hearings on Judicial Dis- 
cipline and Tenure, note 103 supra. These proposals were hotly debated and were finally 
subjected to the congressional amendment process. A compromise bill, reported from the 
Senate Judiciary Committee (see S. REP. NO. 96-362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), re- 
printed in [I9801 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7767), incorporated the best features of 
the three bills. Ultimately, this new bill was passed by the Senate. See 125 CONG. REC. 
$15,435 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1979). 
The Senate-passed legislation accepted for the first time the proposition that com- 
plaints alleging disability or misbehavior by federal judges ought to be filed with the 
circuit councils. The councils were granted specific statutory authority to dismiss or re- 
solve complaints, except that removal from office was expressly forbidden. A new Court 
on Judicial Conduct and Disability was to review the council orders. This court, com- 
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gate era, the American public was demanding a higher standard 
of integrity and accountability of all its governmental institu- 
tions. The judiciary did not escape these demands. As former 
Attorney General Griffin Bell observed during Senate hearings, 
"We are living in a time when our public institutions are under 
examination and the courts are not exempt."1s0 
As a consequence, even after the judiciary had acted, there 
was substantial political mistrust. A representative of the ad- 
ministration testified that, although the circuit rules concerning 
judicial discipline were a definite improvement, they were "not a 
satisfactory substitute for congressional action."1s1 The judicial 
branch did not contest this. Judge James Browning stated dur- 
ing House hearings, "I believe, nonetheless, that legislation 
would still be appropriate in this area."lS2 
Once it was clear that there was a substantial consensus 
that legislation with respect to judicial discipline was needed, 
other reasons for congressional action became apparent. Legisla- 
tive clarification of the powers of the circuit councils was 
thought to be of paramount importance. It was also hoped that a 
congressional enactment would increase public knowledge of the 
circuit councils' decision-making authority.'" In addition, it was 
posed of five sitting article 111 judges appointed by the Chief Justice, was also granted 
broad authority to dismiss the complaint, or affirm, modify, reverse, or remand any ac- 
tion taken by a council. See S. 1873, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See also 125 CONG. 
REC. S15,379, S15,419 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1979) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini and Sen. 
Nunn) . 
Despite the consensus approach adopted by the Senate sponsors, a vigorous floor 
battle still occurred before the bill passed by a roll call vote of 56 to 33. In opposition, 
Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. forcefully argued that the bill was of "dubious consti- 
tutionality, . . . unnecessary and . . . unwise as a matter of public policy." 125 CONG. 
REC. $ 15,389-90 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Mathias). 
150. Judicial Tenure Act: Hearings on S. 1110 Before the Subcomm. on Improve- 
ments in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 142 (1976) (statement of Griffin B. Bell). The cited statement was made before 
Griffin Bell became Attorney General. See also 126 CONG. REC. H8787 (daily ed. Sept. 
15, 1980) (remarks of Peter W. Rodino, Jr.). 
151. Hearings on Judicial Tenure, supra note 15, a t  161 (statement of Maurice 
Rosenburg). 
152. Id. at 89 (testimony of James R. Browning). See also id. a t  59-68 (statement of 
Elmo B. Hunter); Browning, Evaluating Judicial Performance and Related Matters, 90 
F.R.D. 197 (1981). 
153. A Federal Judicial Center report recommended that "awareness of council pow- 
ers should be increased." S. FLANDERS & J. MCDERMOTT, supra note 89, at 33. This ob- 
servation was echoed during congressional hearings: "[there is a] need for more precise 
statutory guidelines for the circuits, so that there would be some uniformity and also 
some public attention would be focused on the mechanism." Hearings on Judicial Ten- 
ure, supra note 15, at 174 (remarks of Robert W. Kastenmeier). 
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felt that in matters of important national concern, such as judi- 
cial discipline, it was desirable for Congress to study and, if pos- 
sible, resolve the policy questions. Congressional involvement 
encourages citizen input on the issue, and allows it to be re- 
solved by democratically elected representatives of the people. 
Finally, legislation was attractive because it ensured a certain 
level of consistency throughout this diverse country?' These 
needs of clarity, public awareness and participation, and nation- 
wide consistency did not necessarily conflict with the earlier de- 
sire for flexibility and decentralization, upon which the 1939 cir- 
cuit council legislation was based. If drafted properly it was 
possible that legislation could accomodate all of these objectives. 
D. Substantive Content of The Judicial Councils Reform Act 
When it became evident that legislative sentiment favored a 
statutory solution to the thorny judicial discipline issue, it be- 
came necessary to find a consensus formula that could achieve 
final passage by the 96th Congress. It bears repeating that pass- 
ing court reform legislation is an arduous political e n d e a ~ 0 r . l ~ ~  I t  
certainly is "no sport for the short-winded."lM An organized, vo- 
cal, and well-financed constituency is lacking, there is a general 
resistance to change in our judicial institutions, and the slightest 
opposition often is able to paralyze congressional progress.lS7 
At the outset, therefore, it was of paramount importance 
that a moderate approach be used-one that was built on com- 
promise rather than confrontation and one that would satisfy 
constitutional, policy, and budget  consideration^.^^^ Like a long- 
154. One congressman complained that the councils' rules lacked uniformity and 
noted that this was one of the reasons for the legislation. 126 CONG. REC. H8786 (daily 
ed. Sept. 15, 1980) (remarks of Tom Railsback). 
155. Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 18, at 339-40. 
156. This is Judge Vanderbilt's famous phrase. A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS 
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION xix (1949). 
157. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 2, a t  198. 
158. This was exactly the appproach taken to enact the Judicial Councils Reform 
Act. With successful passage of judicial discipline bills by the Senate during the 95th and 
96th Congresses (see note 149 supra), a growing number of diverse proposals were intro- 
duced in the House of Representatives. For an excellent analysis of all of these bills, see 
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND TENURE PROPOSALS, QGTH 
CONG.,  ST SESS. (1979), reprinted in Judicial Tenure and Discipline: Hearings on Judi- 
cial Tenure and Discipline 1979-80 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and 
the Administration of Justice, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 507 (1979-1980). The bills were 
referred to the House Judiciary Committee, which further referred them to its Subcom- 
mittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, chaired by Robert 
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awaited addition to a solidly constructed but too small house, 
the Judicial Councils Reform A d  accomplished this by using 
preexisting columns, walls, and foundation. The Act relies upon 
chief judges of the circuits, circuit councils, and the Judicial 
Conference of the United States. The breadth and flexibility of 
the 1939 statute creating the circuit councils are preserved. At 
the same time, improvements are made in five critical areas. 
First, the Judicial Councils Reform Act consolidates, and if 
anything slightly enlarges, the original grant of authority to the 
circuit councils. I t  accomplishes this by providing that the coun- 
cils have power to "make all necessary and appropriate orders 
for the effective administration of justice within [their] cir- 
cuit[s]."lW The new phrase "administration of justice" is in- 
serted in lieu of "administration of the business of the 
courts."1eo Although it is arguable that both phrases mean the 
same thing,"' use of fresh language adds clout and breadth to 
W. Kastenmeier. 
The subcommittee commenced hearings on the pending proposals during the sum- 
mer of 1979. See Hearings on Judicial Tenure, note 15 supra. During the hearings, 
Judge Elmo B. Hunter-in a significant clarification of the position of the Judicial Con- 
ference of the United States--expressed opposition to the creation of any new court or 
commission. After recommending that Congress rely more heavily on the chief judges of 
the circuits and the circuit councils, he asked the subcommittee to carefully analyze the 
need for legislation and then to formulate an appropriate response. Id. at 59-68. 
On May 14,1980, after the House hearing record had been closed, the subcommittee 
held an informal caucus. It was determined that legislation was necessary, that a draft 
bill ought to be prepared, and that the bill should contain various features: specific legis- 
lative clarification of the circuit councils' powers, a means to get a difficult complaint 
before the Judicial Conference, a requirement that there be some uniformity in council 
rules, district judge representation on the councils, and a certain degree of flexibility in 
the entire scheme. 
The draft bill was then circulated to every member of the subcommittee. Sugges- 
tions were received and changes made. Finally, with cosponsorship by every subcommit- 
tee member, H.R. 7974 was introduced. See H.R. 7974, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The 
bill moved through Committee and the full House without amendment. See H.R. REP. 
No. 96-1313,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980); 126 CONG. REC. H8783-88 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 
1980). 
Differences between the House and Senate bills were then worked out on an infor- 
mal basis. Compromise changes were incorporated in a DeConcini amendment to the 
House bill. The amended bill unanimously passed the Senate by voice vote on Septem- 
ber 30, 1980. 126 CONG. REC. S13,854-66 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980). Finally, on October 1, 
1980, the House accepted the Senate amendment and sent the bill on its way to the 
White House. 126 CONG. REC. H10,188 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980). 
159. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, $ 2(c), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) 
(to be codified as 28 U.S.C. $ 332(d)(l)). 
160. See 28 U.S.C. $ 332(d) (1976). 
161. The 1961 Judicial Conference Report on the Powers and Responsibilities of the 
Judicial Councils, presented to the House Committee on the Judiciary by Chairman 
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the statutory text. The House Report confirms this by stating 
that the new council powers are broad enough to cover such 
problems as the loss of public esteem and confidence in the 
court system.ls2 In short, the phrase "administration of justice" 
includes the institutional appearance of justice, whereas the 
"business of the courts" language reflects concern only with the 
courts' technical and internal administrative workings. 
Second, the Act gives effect to the broadened mandate by 
adding to the circuit councils' statutory power. "Each council is 
authorized to hold hearings, to take sworn testimony, and to is- 
sue subpoenas and subpoenas duces t e ~ u r n . " ~ ~ ~  A procedure is 
set forth for the issuance of the subpoenas.ls4 Although circuit 
councils have had more success taking informal action,166 grant- 
ing them formal hearing and subpoena power provides them 
with a versatile arsenal to meet the difficult case, which in all 
likelihood will arise in the context of judicial discipline.ls6 Since 
Emanuel Celler, similarly concluded: 
The responsibility of the Councils "for the effective and expeditious ad- 
ministration of the business of the courts within its circuit" extends not merely 
to the business of the courts in its technical sense (judicial administration), 
such as the handling and dispatching of cases, but also to the business of the 
judiciary in its institutional sense (administration of justice), such as the 
avoiding of any stigma, disrepute, or other element of loss of public esteem and 
confidence in respect to the court system, from the actions of a judge or other 
person attached to the courts. 
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 51 (March 1961) 
(emphasis added). For an excellent textbook on judicial administration and for further 
analysis of this terminology, see R. WHEELER & H. WHITCOMB, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
(1977). 
162. In this regard, the council powers are specifically enlarged to include judicial 
discipline and disability. For further discussion of the need for clarity in this area, see 
Judicial Tenure Act: Hearings on S. 1110 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in 
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75-77 
(1976) (discussion between Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., and Roman Hruska). 
163. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, $ 2(c), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) 
(to be codified as 28 U.S.C. $ 332(d)(l)). This culminated nearly forty years of efforts to 
provide the councils with subpoena power. See, e.g., REPORTS ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. (June 1941); REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 249-50 (Sept. 1958). 
164. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, $ 2(c), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) 
(to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 332(d)(l)). 
165. S. FLANDERS & J. MCDERMOTT, supra note 89, at 28. Wallace, Must We Have 
the Nunn Bill? The Alternative of Judicial Councils of the Circuits, 51 IND. L.J. 297, 
314 (1976). 
166. During Senate hearings on judicial discipline a federal judge noted that the 
lack of subpoena authority had created "difficulty in some instances in getting informa- 
tion which ordinarily is not available." Hearings on Judicial Fitness Before the Sub- 
comm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
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it often is difficult to obtain information from the legal profes- 
sion without the power to compel testimony, the subpoena 
power is a significant new weapon for the councils. However, by 
not requiring resort to subpoenas and hearings, the legislation 
gives the councils the requisite flexibility to solve a matter as 
they think best, either informally or by formal hearing with 
compelled evidence. 
Third, the Judicial Councils Reform Act provides that "[all1 
judicial officers and employees of the circuit shall promptly 
carry into effect all orders of the judicial council."167 Previously, 
district judges were the only ones specifically importuned to re- 
spect the councils' orders.'" While it was regarded as implicit 
that circuit judges also had to carry out council orders, it is de- 
sirable to clarify exactly who falls under the councils' order um- 
brella. In this context, by specifically stating that all judicial of- 
ficers and employees are covered, the Act avoids unnecessary 
ambiguity. As a result, it becomes patently clear that the coun- 
cils' authority extends to everyone who works for the federal ju- 
dicial system at  the circuit and district court levels, be they ten- 
ured judges, bankruptcy judges, magistrates, circuit executives, 
clerks of court, public defenders, court reporters, secretaries, 
bailiffs, or law ~ 1 e r k s . l ~ ~  Again, clarity in the statutory text may 
help to avoid a particularly thorny matter that might arise in 
the future. 
Fourth, in an important caveat, the legislation states that 
"[u]nless an impediment to the administration of justice is in- 
volved, regular business of the courts need not be referred to the 
[circuit] council."170 As the House Report explained, " [t] his lan- 
guage creates a presumption that the council should not be used 
as an alternative or back-up appeal route, or as an administra- 
89th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, 11 (1965) (statement of John Biggs, Jr.). A second federal 
judge reiterated this during the 96th Congress hearings. Senate Hearings on Judicial 
Discipline and Tenure, supra note 103, a t  47 (statexent of J. Edward Lumbard). 
167. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 5 2(c), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) 
(to be codified as 28 U.S.C. $ 332(d)(2)). 
168. 28 U.S.C. 5 332(d) (1976). 
169. In one of the few judicial decisions to discuss the powers of the circuit councils, 
the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit ordered a Pennsylvania court reporter to file a 
written report with the Department of Justice and the Administrative Office on aspects 
of his unauthorized court reporting practice. The reporter voluntarily complied and did 
not test the ambit of the then-statutory scheme-that only district judges had to follow 
council orders. In  re Rodebaugh, 10 F.R.D. 207 (Jud. Council of 3d Cir. 1950). 
170. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 2(c), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) 
(to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 5 332(d)(3)). 
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tive grievance mechanism."171 What this amounts to-and it is 
significant in its import-is that the circuit councils are adminis- 
trative, as opposed to adjudicative, entities. Again, the House 
Report made this very clear: 
[Tlhe legislation creates much more of an "inquisitorial-ad- 
ministrative" model than an "accusatorial-adversary'' one. In 
this regard, the judicial council is not to be thought of as a 
passive and impartial referee; rather, the council can become 
the active gatherer of evidence and can control the objectives 
and nature of the 
In short, the circuit council model envisioned by the recently en- 
acted legislation continues to be that of an administrative body 
acting as a "board of directors" for the circuit.17' This body, di- 
vorced from direct involvement in the courts' case-by-case dis- 
position of cases and controversies, has authority to monitor the 
general administration of justice within those courts. 
It goes almost without saying that the circuit councils must 
act fairly. Their general mandate to promote the "effective and 
expeditious administration of justice" requires this.lV4 Yet, as re- 
lates to the judicial disability and discipline issue, fears have 
been expressed about the possibility of one group of judges 
"ganging up" or "hazing" one of their brethren? In response to 
171. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980). 
172. Id. at  14. In a footnote, the House Report continued: "The 'Inquisitorial' type 
procedure has worked well in many of the European court systems and there is little 
reason to doubt its adaptability to the proposed legislation." Id. at  14 11.33. 
Individuals trained exclusively in the adversary system should not close their minds 
to civil law techniques, making the grevious error of using the word "inquisitorial" as an 
epithet. "It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in the 
phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis." Hyde v. United 
States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See Schaefer, Is the Adversary 
System Working in Optimul Fashion, in POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at  171. A 
highly respected federal judge agrees with this: 
Whoever first characterized the continental European system as "inquisitorial" 
did a profound disservice to constructive legal thought. Substitute "inquiring" 
and the bad becomes the good. The adversary system is not the only way to 
the truth; indeed, it has too often been a game in which both sides vie in their 
efforts to obscure the truth. Hopefully, by the year 2000, we will have learned 
where to preserve the adversary system and where to substitute something 
else. 
Hearings Before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, 
Second Phase, vol. I, a t  205 (1974) (statement of Henry J. Friendly). 
173. See Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 86 n.7 (1970). 
174. See Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 5 2(c), 94 Stat. 2035 
(1980) (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 5 332(d)(l)). 
175. See Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 140 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissent- 
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these fears, the Act clothes the councils' increased discipline 
powers with several protective robes. There is a screening proce- 
dure for the processing of complaints-first to the circuit's chief 
judge and then, if not resolved, to a special committee appointed 
by the chief judge. The goal of this process is to ferret out frivo- 
lous complaints related to the merits of a judicial decision. If a 
complaint is well-grounded enough to proceed past the screening 
stage, then basic due process rights must be accorded a judge or 
judicial employee who is the subject of the allegations. The Act 
expressly provides that the individual complained about must be 
give notice of the charges, as well as the rights to appear (in 
person or by counsel) to present oral and documentary evidence, 
to compel the attendance of witnesses, and to cross-examine 
witnesses.176 
Moreover, for those matters not resolved at the early stages, 
an appeal to the Judicial Conference of the United States may 
be available.17' In this manner, the authority of the Conference 
to monitor the functioning of the circuit councils with respect to 
judicial discipline is augmented. For the first time in its history, 
but only in the limited area of judicial discipline and disability, 
the Conference (or a standing committee thereof) is given the 
power to make necessary and appropriate orders in the excerise 
of its authority. In addition, the Act provides the Conference or 
a standing committee thereof with discretion to hold hearings, 
take sworn testimony, and issue subpoenas or subpoenas duces 
tecum. Last, the Conference may proscribe rules for the exercise 
of authority under the Act.17' The augmented power of the Judi- 
cial Conference, if used widely and sparingly, should deter any 
potential "hazing" of individualistic federal judges. Combined 
with the enlarged authority of the circuit councils, it may actu- 
ally increase the independence of the federal judicial branch. 
The fifth critical area which the Judicial Councils Reform 
Act deals with is the composition of the circuit councils. The 
recently enacted statute requires district judge representation on 
ing). See also Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 712-15 
(1979). 
176. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 5 3(a), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) 
(to be codified as 28 U.S.C. § 372). For a more in-depth discussion of the procedure to be 
used in the councils, see H.R. REP. NO. 96-1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-15 (1980). 
177. See Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 3(a), 94 Stat. 2035 
(1980) (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10)). 
178. Id. § 4 (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 8 331). 
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the  council^.^^ This change, debated for almost forty years,180 
was made to ensure participation in council affairs by lower 
court judges who, it is safe to say, possess a greater degree of 
experience in the operation of trial courts. Their knowledge and 
perspective are essential to fair and evenhanded council deci- 
sionmaking, not only on disciplinary matters but also on all judi- 
cial administration subjects. A highly respected circuit judge ob- 
served, "[Dlistrict judges have concerns and insights which 
would make their presence in the circuit council particularly ad- 
v a n t a g e ~ ~ ~ . " ~ ~ ~  In addition, by expanding the participation base 
of an important decisionmaking entity, the Act heightens the 
democratic credence accorded the decisionmaker. The primary 
recipient of council orders has been the district court. Because 
the Act calls for the input of district judges in the decisionmak- 
ing process, the credibility these judges accord to final decisions 
is likely to rise.lS2 
With certain provisos, the legislation delegates to the cir- 
cuits the authority to specify the size and nature of the councils, 
as well as the method to be followed in selecting its members. 
The chief judge of the circuit is the presiding officer. He must * 
call a meeting of council at least twice a year. The number of 
circuit judges on the council is fixed by majority vote of all cir- 
cuit judges in regular active service. The number of district 
judges is also established by majority vote of the circuit judges 
in regular active service, except that on councils with fewer than 
six circuit judges, there must be at least two district judges, and 
on councils with six or more circuit judges, there must be at 
least three district judges.lSs In both instances, district and cir- 
179. Id. 5 2(a) (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 5 332(a)). 
180. This is manifested in a letter from Chief Justice Hughes to Judge D. Lawrence 
Groner, reprinted in the House Report on the Administrative Office Act: "If at any time 
it is desired to expand the council in the circuits by providing for a representation of 
district judges, this can be done by simple amendment without departing from the prin- 
ciple of the provision." H.R. REP. NO. 702, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1939). 
181. Wallace, The Nunn Bill: An Unneeded Compromise of Judicial Independence, 
61 JUDICATURE 476, 481 (1978). 
182. Similar thoughts are expressed in the Senate Report on the Federal Court Im- 
provement Act of 1979. S. REP. NO. 96-304, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
183. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 5 2(a), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) 
(to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 5 332(a)). This basic framework conforms with a resolution of 
the Judicial Conference of the United States. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDI- 
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE US. 6-7 (March 1979). The Conference's recommendations 
were drafted to incorporate "an appropriate degree of 'managerial flexibility.' " Hearings 
on Judicial Tenure, supra note 15, at 67 (statement of Elmo B. Hunter). 
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cuit judge representation can be equal.'" 
The Judicial Councils Reform Act thus gives the circuit 
councils increased ability to meet the problems they have faced 
in the past. However, the burdens and pressures imposed on the 
councils will be far greater than they were when the councils 
were created in 1939. For one thing, Congress will be watching. 
As Senator Dennis DeConcini warned, "[als part of a vigorous 
oversight responsibility, I plan to monitor implementation of the 
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act."18s During debate on the 
judicial discipline issue in the House, Congressman Caldwell 
Butler agreed: "I would like to impress on my colleagues the im- 
portance of conducting congressional oversight in this most sen- 
sitive area."ls6 
To facilitate this congressional oversight, the legislation 
contains a report-back provision. The Director of the Adminis- 
trative Office must include in his annual report a summary of 
judicial discipline and disability complaints, "indicating the gen- 
eral nature of such complaints and the disposition of those com- 
plaints in which action has been taken."ls7 Similarly, the circuit 
councils and the Judicial Conference (or a standing committee 
thereof) must make available to the public every order issued to 
implement a remedial or sanctioning action.lM In short, rather 
than entering into a period of hibernation, the councils can ex- 
pect to have their new authority and broadened powers more 
carefully scrutinized by the public, press, bar, and Congress.18s 
With the new set of measures provided by the Judicial 
Councils Reform Act, the circuit councils should be ready to 
commence the decade that will celebrate the two hundredth 
birthday of the United States Constitution. Hopefully, in re- 
sponse to the accompanying augmented public and political 
scrutiny, the councils will succeed in satisfying their new 
184. See, e.g., STH CIR. RULE GOVERNING THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE JUDICIAL COUN- 
CIL 2 (1981). 
185. 126 CONG. REC. S13,858 (daily ed. Sept. 30,1980) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). 
186. 126 CONG. REC. H8788 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Butler). 
187. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 8 5,94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (to 
be codified as 28 U.S.C. 5 604(h)(2)). 
188. Id. $ 3 (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 5 372(c)(15)). In all other instances rights to 
confidentiality are preserved, unless the material is needed for an impeachment or a 
written waiver is obtained. Id. (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 8 372(c)(14)). 
189. For an example of how the press scrutinizes the circuit councils, see Hearings 
on Judicial Tenure, supra note 15, at 106 (testimony of Clark Mollenhoff and Greg 
Rushford). 
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mandate. 
E. Objectives of Judicial Administration Emphasized by the 
Judicial Councils Reform Act 
The Judicial Councils Reform Act lends new emphasis to 
several desirable objectives of judicial administration. These in- 
clude (1) decentralization of administrative authority in the cir- 
cuit councils, (2) unification of the court system, (3) increased 
responsibility through clearer delegation of authority to the 
councils, (4) maintenance of flexibility, rather than adherence to 
detailed rules, in controlling the work of the councils, and (5) 
preservation of a rational relationship between basic governmen- 
tal theory and the day-to-day administrative workings of the ju- 
dicial system. 
1. Decentralization of Authority 
Since the early days of this nation, judicial administration 
machinery has been constructed on the solid principle of re- 
gional and individual decentralization of authority. By selecting 
the twelve circuit councils as recipients of the judicial discipline 
authority, by rejecting the creation of a centrally located (un- 
doubtedly somewhere near the Potomac River) court or commis- 
sion, and by adding district court representation to the councils, 
Congress has once again given its approval to a significant 
amount of localism in the administration of the federal 
judiciary. 
Of all the issues in the recently passed legislation, thiq was 
the one about which the judges themselves were most concerned. 
In arguing that creation of a national office was fraught with 
long-term dangers, Judge Elmo Hunter concluded, "An institu- 
tionalized office-any such office-be it a bureau in an executive 
agency, a subcommittee of Congress, or an administrative unit in 
the court system-has a natural tendency to perpetuate its own 
existence."lM This argument prevailed. The structure of the fed- 
190. Id. at 65 (statement of Elmo B. Hunter). Judge Hunter continued his argument 
by stating: 
If you create an office specifically designed only to investigate judicial misbe- 
havior and authorize it to exercise extensive powers, how long will it be before 
that office feels compelled to demonstrate its worth by establishing impressive 
precedents? I do not wish to overemphasize that concern, because it may be a 
peripheral one; I can, however, assure you that it is extensively shared by many 
judges. 
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eral judiciary remains decentralized, hierarchical (in the sense of 
courts and not judges), and pyramidal. Total centralization of 
function is the exception rather than the rule.lel 
2. Unification 
Carefully structured decentralization of specific responsibili- 
ties does not conflict with the overall requirement of court unifi- 
cation, also stressed in the reform. "A unified court system is 
one that is organized according to uniform and simple divisions 
of jurisdiction and operates under a common administrative au- 
thority."ln The Judicial Councils Reform Act does not prevent 
court unification by creating totally autonomous circuit councils. 
By also increasing the Judicial Conference's authority to oversee 
the councils, the Act actually reinforces the existence of a com- 
mon administrative authority in the federal judicial family. In 
addition, by continuing to rely on the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts for st& and budgetary support, on the 
Federal Judicial Center for research assistance, and on the Chief 
Justice of the United States and the chief judges of the circuits 
for leadership, the Act treats the federal judiciary as a unified 
entity. 
Unification in the administration of the federal courts is 
also accomplished by management structure and techniques that 
are consistent and clear.leS Consistency should be achieved by 
the Act's conferral of clearer authority upon the circuit councils 
and by increased public scrutiny and more vigorous congres- 
sional oversight, both of which should minimize the uncertainty 
and inconsistency which have resulted from the ambiguity that 
previously characterized the circuit councils' responsibilities. 
3. Increased Responsibility 
A third objective of the reform is responsibility. Good ad- 
ministration implies that someone or some entity must stand 
out as the decisionmaker to be held accountable if the system is 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
191. Judge Clifford Wallace emphasized this factor during' his congressional testi- 
mony: "[Tlhe entire structure is built upon the principle of decentralization of author- 
ity." Id. at 76 (testimony of J. Clifford Wallace). 
192. ABA Standards Relating to Court Organization 4 (Tentative Draft 1973). 
In a structure as hierarchical and loosely organized as the federal court system, total 
uniformity does not have to be the paramount goal. 
193. Id. at 12. 
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not working properly or if it is not functioning as efficiently as it 
might. Responsibility depends on a clear statement of authority, 
an adequate grant of tools to make and enforce decisions, eonfi- 
dence and willingness to use the given tools, and credibility and 
acceptability by those who must abide by the decision. 
The Judicial Councils Reform Act specifically upgrades and 
defines the authority of the chief judges of the circuits. I t  clearly 
identifies the circuit council as the decisionmaker for a wide va- 
riety of issues, including complaints against disabled and misbe- 
having federal judges. At the same time, it  provides the councils 
with a concise statement of their authority and powers. I t  also 
allows, in the context of juducial discipline and disability, the 
Judicial Conference to act through a standing committee ap- 
pointed by the Chief Justice of the United States. Last, when an 
order is entered against a misbehaving or disabled judge, the Act 
requires that it be made available to the public. Each such order 
must be accompanied by written reasons therefor unless con- 
trary to the interests of justice. 
4. Flexibility 
The legislation also stresses the theme of flexibility. Indis- 
putably, our justice system is a product of competing and con- 
stantly changing societal, economic, political, and geographical 
factors. Law is a bit like an armistice, a provisional peace in 
which diverse and conflicting social forces consent temporarily 
to suspend open warfare on the basis of a cease fire agreement 
that each will maintain the positions conquered. Justice systems 
therefore seek to achieve, for a time at  least, peace and balance 
between competing forces. To succeed in this, courts and judges 
need a generous amount of flexibility to meet the ebb and flow 
of societal pressures before them. 
The circuit council reform nourishes flexibility in judicial 
administration by improving an existing institution and by 
broadening its mandate, while not being unduly specific or de- 
tailed. It delegates a large dose of discretion to sitting judges. It 
respects the need to provide substantial protection for judges 
who are the subject of complaints without so exaggerating the 
desire for due process rights as to make the procedure ineffec- 
tual. Finally, it affords the public adequate protection from the 
occasional corrupt judge without creating open season on judi- 
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cia1 offi~ers.'~ A mechanism to screen out frivolous complaints is 
set forth; a diverse arsenal of decisonal weapons is provided; an 
inquisitive administrative process is encouraged; non-judicial 
branch personnel are not added to the new councils; a new court 
or commission is not created; there is no centralized bpeau- 
cracy; and ironclad adversary procedures are not mandated. 
5. Rationality 
Finally, the Judicial Councils Reform Act seeks to meet the 
theoretical test of rationality. "Theory is the most important 
part of the dogma of the law, as the architect is the most impor- 
tant man who takes part in the building of a house."lB6 Rational- 
ity requires the identification of a present problem, the formula- 
tion of a policy goal, and a finding that the proposed action will * 
solve the desired goal without undue disruption. A look at the 
legislative history of the Act reveals that this test was followed 
and met. 
At the outset, Congress was importuned to "measure the 
need for the legislation and then to draft a logical, economical 
and fair solution to the problem. "In Accordingly, a problem-of 
less scope than some had argued, but greater in magnitude than 
some had hoped-was first identified. Next, the policy objective 
was formulated: "To improve judicial accountability and ethics, 
to promote respect for the principle that the appearance of jus- 
tice is an integral element of this country's system of justice, 
and, at the same time, to maintain the independence and auton- 
omy of the judicial branch of government."lW Finally, with the 
cooperation of all three branches of government, a finding was 
made that a compromise-consensus piece of legislation was ap- 
propriate to meet the desired goals.lB8 In short, Congress-with 
input from the judicial and executive branches-found that the 
principle of judicial independence is not mutually exclusive with 
the effective and expedititous administration of justice. 
194. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980). 
195. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897). 
196. 126 CONG. REC. H8785 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1980) (remarks of Rep. 
Kastenmeier). 
197. 126 CONG. REC. S13,858 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). 
198. In letters from Hon. Benjamin Civiletti to Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (Sept. 11, 
1980) and Hon. Elmo B. Hunter to Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier (June 14, 1980), repre- 
sentatives of the executive and judicial branches expressed their firm support for the 
legislation. See also 126 CONG. REC. H8785 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1980) (remarks of Rep. 
Kastenmeier). 
736 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
Related to rationality is the proposition that the benefits of 
court reform should not just flow to judges, lawyers, or court ad- 
ministrators, but to those most affected by the legal pro- 
cess-the litigants. "By all means let us reform that process, let 
us make it more swift, more efficient, and less expensive, but 
above all let us make it more just."lee The quality of justice can 
be improved by increasing judicial accountability and by im- 
proving judicial administration while respecting judicial inde- 
pendence. The beneficiaries of such changes are not only judges, 
lawyers, and c ~ u r t  administrators, but also litigants-the con- 
sumers of this country's justice system. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The maintenance of an effective and efficiently adminis- 
tered federal judiciary requires periodic reevaluation of the sys- 
tem currently responsible for ensuring that the courts' work is 
being done well. The most recent evaluation was done by Con- 
gress during the consideration and passage of the Judicial Coun- 
cils Reform Act of 1980. The Act is not a panacea for all judicial 
administration problems. It is, however, more than mere tinker- 
ing. It provides the federal judiciary with an implement-a boat 
hook, if you will-to reach and hold tightly to the constantly 
moving and heaving ship of the people.'OO It provides judges and 
court administrators with a means of accomplishing the very dif- 
ficult task that the Constitution and Congress have assigned to 
them-administering justice in an equal, fair, impartial, expedi- 
tious, and inexpensive manner in ever-changing conditions. 
199. Higginbotham, The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform, in POUND CON- 
FERENCE, supra note 2, at 87,110. In this regard, the needs of the poor, weak, powerless, 
and under-represented should receive special consideration. 
200. Reflecting on the need for men and machinery to work together, Pound aptly 
observed: "Things are done by the combined working of men and machinery. In that 
machinery is no negligible item. The right men will do much no matter what machinery 
is given them to work with. But our ideal must be the right men with the right machin- 
ery." R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 293 (1940). 
